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Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled
C. RONALD CHESTER*
INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL ENDS OR "DEAD HAND" CONTROL?
Since the Enlightenment, the notion of history as progress has been a
popular one in the West.1 For the most part, this view has eschewed the
rigidly deterministic vision which many see as characteristic of Hegel
and Marx.2 Cyclical views 3 or the idea of history as accident 4 are not
favored in the Western democracies. Yet, in examining the halting evolu-
tion of the cy pres doctrine in America after the Supreme Court declared
charitable trusts valid in 1844,1 one might infer that the expansion of the
doctrine has been accidental, and thus subject to haphazard reversal. As
once "dying" restrictions on the use of cy pres regain their strength in
the modern era, one may even feel the doctrine's evolution to be cyclical.
Whatever the reasons for the erratic course of cy pres in America, the
doctrine presents a promise unfulfilled for those who would have expand-
ed its use.
An appropriate starting point for this discussion can be found in two
expressions of the polar forces between which the American doctrine of
cy pres has vacillated over the last one hundred thirty-five years. Each
was written in the period when the journal printing it was the primary
source for the dominant jurisprudence of its time. We begin with the
Legal Realist viewpoint of the Yale Law Journal in 1939:
[The] American application [of cy pres] should have been
governed by socially desirable results rather than by historical
distinctions no longer of importance.... [The problem is in the
process of being corrected by] the highly desirable trend of the
courts toward disregarding the specific fulfillment of the
*B.A. Harvard, 1966; M. Int. Aff. & J.D., Columbia, 1970; Diploma in Criminology, Cam-
bridge, 1971. Professor of Law, New England Law School, Boston; Foskett Visiting Pro-
fessor, Indiana University Law School, Bloomington, 1979-80. The author acknowledges
the able research assistance of Sara M. Webster, New England Law School, 1979.
'E. H. CARR. WHAT IS HISTORY? 144-76 (1962). Carr, once a prominent Cambridge
historian mentions Edward Gibbon as a proponent of this view of history which he (Carr)
shared. For an American example of this view, see Charles A. Beard's introduction to J. B.
BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS iX-Xl (1932).
2See Oxford historian Isaiah Berlin's discussion and rejection of the determinism. of
Hegel and Marx in HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY 22-24 (1954).
3See CARR, supra note 1, at 145, where the cyclical conceptions of the Ancient Greeks and
Romans are examined.
'See, e.g., Bury, Darwinism and History and Cleopatra's Nose in SELECTED ESSAYS OF
J.B. BURY 23-42, 60-69 (E. Temperley ed. 1930). Bury, like Carr, was a noted Cambridge
historian.
5Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). Once validated, charitable trusts whose
purposes became impossible to accomplish could be reformed by a cy pres (Law French for
.so near") use of the trust fund for a similar charitable purpose.
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donor's design in favor of the interests of public welfare.,
The author concludes by echoing Llewellyn's famous Realist dictum
regarding the undesirability of covert means in changing legal doctrine:7
"[C]ourts in reaching results which obviously show the impact of social
considerations should not continue to couch their decisions in the out-
moded terminology of the eighteenth century." 8 Thus, in applying the cy
pres doctrine to charitable trusts, courts should explicitly recognize the
element of social welfare in the doctrine to avoid the impression of
"judicial hypocrisy."9
The Harvard Law School of the 1890's was a very different place in a
very different time than the Yale Law School of the socially-conscious
1930's. Yet, the individualistic jurisprudence which characterized Har-
vard Law School at that time still has great force today. Regarding with
dismay the use of cy pres to modify charitable trusts, Joseph A. Willard 0
suggested in the 1894 Harvard Law Review that the testator of his day,
"not intending a purchase of heaven with his [charitable gift], but a
specific bequest to a specific charity,"
may be presumed to have known not merely what he intended,
but what he did not intend, in the case of a charity, as well as of
any testamentary disposition made by him; ... the court in im-
puting to him what he did not say, because he might have said
it, may ... run some risk of making him say what he would
have emphatically repudiated."1
Of course, the Yale commentator of forty-five years later would have
cared little what a testator's specific intent was, so long as the fund from
a failed charitable bequest could be applied cy pres by the court for the
"common good." Nor would the Yale writer have protected an individual
testator's right to control the use of property from his grave-via the so-
called "dead-hand"-a principle evidently dear to Attorney Willard. He
could scarcely have foreseen that, under the guise of two of the primary
requirements for modification of trusts through cy pres, dead hand con-
trol would still be a reality in the 1970's. These requirements were (1) that
there be a general charitable intent of the donor in addition to the specific
one that has failed, and less importantly, (2) that the specific intent of the
donor has become impractical or impossible of performance. 2
'Note, A Revaluatibn of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 308, 322 (1939).
"Covert tools are never reliable tools." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700,
703 (1939).
'Revaluation, supra note 6, at 322.
'Id at 323.
"0Joseph A. Willard, attorney and clerk of the Superior Court of Massachusetts, wrote A
HALF CENTURY WITH JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1895). His paternal grandfather, Joseph
Willard, was President of Harvard College.
"Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HARv. L. REv. 69, 91-92 (1894).
"For a discussion of these and other less significant requirements for the application of
cy pres, see E. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 128 et seq. (1950).
Edith Fisch, a distinguished member of the New York, Federal and Supreme Court Bars,
attained her J.Sc.D. degree at Columbia Law School in 1950 on the basis of her exhaustive
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Before placing the current law of cy pres on the continuum between in-
dividual and societal control of charitable trusts, it will be necessary to
review the checkered history both of charitable trusts and of the applica-
tion of cy pres in America.
1800-1844: ACCEPTANCE OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
To appreciate the new nation's antipathy toward charitable trusts, one
must understand as Lawrence Friedman put it, that "in the early 19th
century, charity was associated with privilege, with the dead hand, with
established churches, with massive wealth held in perpetuity."'13 Further-
more, what Morton Horwitz calls a "flexible, instrumental conception of
law" 4 was proving necessary to promote the transformation of the post-
revolutionary American legal system. Land held in perpetuity by chur-
ches was not susceptible of being developed by private, individual en-
trepreneurs, thus hindering the economic development so vital to an ex-
panding nation.
In Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Executors," the
Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, repealed all English statutes,
including the Statute of Charitable Uses. The Court erroneously found
that the English equity courts had no inherent jurisdiction to sustain
charitable trusts.16 It was not long, however, before influential elements
of the new society discovered that restrictions imposed by this case com-
plicated the legal status of religious bodies. Moreover, by hamstringing
gifts intended for education, poor relief and other necessary social ser-
vices, these restrictions proved costly to society as a whole."
Judges such as Henry Baldwin and James Kent began arguing for a
pragmatic, permissive legal doctrine which took account of contem-
porary practice. To those who countered that law had always been
suspicious of perpetuities and that a charitable trust was indeed
perpetual, these judges replied that the public received sufficient benefit
from charitable bequests to warrant liberal interpretations. Moreover,
they stressed the legal right of testators to control property beyond the
grave, claiming that the power to make charitable bequests with the ex-
pectation that they be faithfully executed was within an individual's
property rights.' Ironically it was this stand in favor of the "dead hand"
thesis on the cy pres doctrine, published under the above title. Also author of NEW YORK
EVIDENCE (1959), LAWYERS IN INDUSTRY (1956) and STATE LAWS ON EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
(1953), she has served as Vice President of the Women Lawyers Association of the State of
New York.
I'L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 223 (1973).
I'M. HORWITz. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 254 (1977).
"117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
"See Fisch, American Acceptance of Charitable Trusts, 28 N.D. LAW. 219, 225 (1953).
'
7H. MILLER, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776-1844, at 42 (1961).
1 IcL
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that later deterred the expansion of the social usefulness of charitable be-
quests which had been made possible by free application of the cy pres
doctrine.19
Still, opposition to philanthropy persisted among an influential group
of judges and legislators. For example, St. George Tucker, James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson and other secular-minded and progressive
Virginians felt charities symbolized advancing clerical power in society,
threatening the rights of future generations. 0 Justice Story believed that
charities trampled individual rights by depriving heirs of their property.
He complained of the lack of safeguards, such as the mortmain statutes
in England, 1 against the making of unwise charitable gifts. "We are in
some danger," he felt, "of having our most valuable estates locked up in
mortmain, and our surplus wealth pass away in specious or mistaken
charities, founded upon visionary or useless schemes.. . ."22 Coupled with
the fear of clerical control and the power of the dead hand to pass pro-
perty away from the living, was a fear of corporations in general, because
of their impersonal nature and perpetual life. 23
While fear of the consequences of permitting property to pass from
general circulation into the hands of perpetual charitable associations
argued against permissive charity policy, religious teachings,
humanitarian and social needs argued-for it. 2 4 The time when the balance
turned in favor of the charitable trust is generally marked by the case of
Stephen Girard's will, Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 25 in which Supreme
Court support for charitable trusts was finally affirmed. While the
majority of states were happy to embrace this judicial blessing of the
charitable trust, a more restrictive attitude toward the device remained
important in states like Virginia, New York and Maryland.2 6 Whenever
"See CONCLUSION infra.
2MILLER, supra note 17, at 42-43.
21Id. Edward I passed the Statute of Mortmain in 1279 to prevent the church from
owning more land. This statute declared that all land thereafter conveyed to the church or
monasteries would be forfeited to the king. The clerics subsequently evaded this statute
by developing the "conveyance to uses," a forerunner of the modern trust.
Despite Story's protests, the Statute of Mortmain was nover held applicable in America.
Nevertheless, the fear of vast wealth held in perpetuity caused legislatures in some states
to pass statutes restricting transfers to charity by gift, conveyance or will. Typical of
these prohibitions are the restrictions remaining in seven states on the percentage of the
estate which can be left to charity and the making of such bequests within a short time
before death. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 340-41 (2nd.
ed. 1978).
22Review, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Chancery of New York, 11 N. AM.
REV. 140, 147 (1820) (unsigned), attributed to Justice Story by MILLER. supra note 17, at
43-44.
"1MILLER supra note 17, at 47.
'Id at 49.
2543 U.S. 127. The testator was a native of France who immigrated to the United States
before 1776 and settled in Philadelphia. He became a prominent banker and philanthropist,
and died a widower without issue in 1831, leaving real and personal property valued at ap-
proximately $6,700,000. See id. at 128.
"GSee, e.g., Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r, 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897); Holmes v. Mead, 52
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attempts have been made to expand the usefulness of charitable trusts
through devices like cy pres, lingering doubts have resurfaced, par-
ticularly in these states, as to the advisability of allowing perpetual
charities at all.
1844-1900: THE CHARITABLE TRUST COMES OF AGE
Before the 1850's there had been very few charitable trusts created in
the United States and fewer still had been allowed to stand; thus, there
had been only the most occasional demand for the application of cy pres.17
When the demand had arisen, the courts of a large majority of states
were extremely hostile to the doctrine. Of the fifteen states which had
had the occasion to consider cy pres by 1860, the courts of ten states had
either condemned or repudiated its use.2 8 One cause of this antagonism
was the mistaken notion that the doctrine could be exercised only by
means of the uncontrolled prerogative of the sovereign.2 9 Thus, the use of
the so-called prerogative cy pres was heartily resisted in a new nation
fresh from its triumph over monarchical authority. In fact, Chancery had
long exercised an equitable or judicial cy pres which attempted to effec-
tuate the intent of the donor rather than the arbitrary wishes of the
sovereign. 0 It was this judicial cy pres power which eventually found
root in America.
As the fortunes amassed in the industrial revolution began to ac-
cumulate and the need for effective mechanisms to control the use of
these new forms of wealth became manifest, charitable trusts themselves
slowly gained favor. In the main, this was because courts saw that by en-
couraging private contributions, they were reducing the expenses of
government. 3' Thus, courts began to declare charitable trusts "favorites
of the law" and employed liberal rules of construction to support them.32
Still, this was the era of rugged individualism, and the intent of the donor
was paramount. Charitable trusts were construed by detailed inquiries
into the state of the testator's mind and his wishes at the time of the
making of the gift, instead of being seen in light of changing societal con-
N.Y. 332 (1873); Wilderman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 8 Md. 551 (1885).
"For an example, see Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees and Ex'rs, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 354,
366 (1836); see also DiClerico, Cy Pres:'A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U.L. REV. 153, 167
(1967).
"FISCH, supra note 12, at 115 n.1.
"For an example of an outrageous use of prerogative cy pres, see Da Costa v. De Pas, 27
Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754) in which a legacy left by a Jew to establish a Jesuba (an assembly
for reading the law and instructing people in Judaism) was held illegal because it promoted
a religion contrary to that of the established church. It was within the power of the Crown,
the court held, to dispose of the bequest for the instruction of foundlings in the Christian
religion.
1°FISCH. supra note 12, at 56.
"See Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows' Orphans Home & Indus. School Ass'n, 64
P. 33 (1901), reu'd on other grounds, 66 Kan. 1, 71 P. 286 (1903).
"See, e.g., Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163 (1882).
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ditions. Courts of the period would thus encourage gifts to charity by sus-
taining the trust, but were reluctant to interfere with the plan of the
donor by applying cy pres.31 Only six states expressly applied cy pres for
the first time between 1860 and 1900.14
In some degree, late nineteenth century jurists felt that cy pres con-
tradicted the spirit of democratic institutions. This attitude stemmed
from Locke's view of the natural right of property: "The [State] cannot
take from any man any part of his property, without his own consent. 35
Support for this proposition can also be found in Blackstone's Commen-
taries, which championed respect for private property, even at the ex-
pense of community needs 6
A few representative cases are illustrative of the prevailing mood. Har-
vard College v. Society for Promoting Theological Education held that a
court could not substitute a new scheme merely because the trustees
believed that it would be a better or more convenient one than the
settlor's.3 7 To the same effect are White v. Fisk38 and Merrill v. Hayden.39
As late as 1923 a Connecticut court could be heard to express the domi-
nant sentiment of these decisions:
No public benefit, no increased beneficence, no advantage to
religious activity, can justify a court in making over the wills
or contracts of men, in the conviction that changed conditions
make this, if not necessary, at least highly desirable.40
Though much of this decision-making was due to the lingering distrust
of charitable trusts in general, one theory is that many courts declined to
use cy pres in order to make testators secure in making their particular
charitable gifts; without the fear that their specific intent would be upset
by a court applying cy pres, testators would, under this theory, be more
likely to make charitable bequests. 41 Though the age of great foundations
was yet to come, part of the public had already begun to lay moral claim
to "conscience money" from the barons of finance, oil and steel.
Massachusetts courts in particular began to apply this money to public
purposes through the use of cy pres, a doctrine which came to be seen as
"FISCH. supra note 12, at 118-20. See also, Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1959).
4FISCH, supra note 12, at 120 n.14.
11J. LOCKE. SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 187 (Everyman ed. 1924). See Fisch,
The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L. REV. 375, 377 (1953).
16W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 74 (Gavit ed. 1941).
3'69 Mass. (3 Gray) 280 (1855). The Theological Society had brought a bill in equity re-
questing that donations made to Harvard College for theological instruction and held by
the college in trust for the benefit of the divinity school be transferred to the Society or to
an independent Board of Trustees.
1822 Conn. 30 (1852).
3986 Me. 133, 29 A. 949 (1893).
"First Congregational Soc'y v. City of Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22, 37, 121 A. 77, 82 (1923).
"See Bradway, Tendencies in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 5 TEMP. L.Q. 489,
528 (1931).
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essential to the health of any long-term charity.42
The Massachusetts doctrine springs from the great case of Jackson v.
Phillips.4 3 Francis Jackson had died in 1861 leaving money to trustees to
be used to create a public sentiment that would put an end to Negro
slavery; the trustees were to use another part of the fund for the benefit
of fugitive slaves. Since slaves had been legally freed as a result of the
Civil War, 44 by 1867 these objectives could not be literally carried out.
Despite the demands of the settlor's heirs, the court refused to dismantle
the trust and directed the cy pres use of the fund for welfare and educa-
tional work among freed slaves and other New England blacks. 4
According to Lawrence Friedman, this gave the old English doctrine a
"new and different life, as an adjunct of the law of dynastic charities."46
In late nineteenth century New York, however, the charitable trust
itself was still in difficulty. When Samuel J. Tilden, Democratic can-
didate for President in 1876, left a portion of his millions to fund a public
library for the City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals in
Tilden v. Green47 struck down the trust for want of distinguishable
beneficiaries. 4 8 Because of the public outcry at this outrageous decision,
remedial legislation for such gifts was passed by the New York
legislature in 1893. 49 What changed minds in New York, according to
Friedman, was the realization that, when the Tilden trust failed, "no dead
hand became richer [though its relatives did]; but the city itself was the
poorer." 50
"FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 370.
"96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1.
"This favoring of charity over the "dead hand" of the testator was not, however, ex-
tended in Massachusetts to include so-called "secret" trusts in favor of a charity. The
leading case is Olliffe v. Wells, 138 Mass. 221 (1881).
46FRIEDMAN. supra note 13, at 371. By "dynastic charities," Friedman means the
perpetual charities founded by the "new dynasts" of the late nineteenth century, whose
wealth was tied up not in landed estates as in eighteenth century England, but in trusts
containing stocks and bonds.
"130 N.Y. 29,28 N.E 880 (1891). See Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trus4 " 5 HARv. L.
REV. 389 (1892).
"The 35th article of the Tilden will directed his executors and trustees to procure the in-
corporation of the "Tilden Trust" with capacity to establish and maintain from the residue
of his estate a free library and reading room in New York City. If incorporation was not
achieved or if the trustees and executors deemed it "inexpedient" to convey the residue to
the trust, then they were directed to apply it to "such charitable, educational and scientific
purposes as... will render the said... property most widely and substantially beneficial to
the interests of mankind." 130 N.Y. at 44-45, 28 N.E. at 881.
The Court of Appeals found this article an invalid disposition of the residue because the
object and subject of the trust were "indefinite and uncertain." The court stated that
where the power is given to the trustees to select a beneficiary, the class in whose favor the
power may be exercised must be designated by the testator with such certainty that a
court can ascertain the objects of the power. Furthermore, cy pres could not be used to
uphold a gift to indefinite beneficiaries as had been done in England for the doctrine "has
no place in the jurisprudence of this state." 130 N.Y. at 45, 28 N.E. at 882.
"Tilden Act, ch. 701, §1 (1893) (current version at N.Y. Est., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§8.1-1(a) (1967)).
"°FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 370.
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If the New York court had truly wished to effectuate the wishes of
Samuel Tilden, it could have changed the details of administration of the
trust through the doctrine of "equitable deviation." 51 If even such
manipulation of the mechanics of the trust would have failed to satisfy
the strictures of New York law, could not the court have modified the gift
for some allied purpose, thus providing benefit for more specific
beneficiaries under the cy pres doctrine? Certainly it could have been
shown that Tilden had possessed the general charitable intent necessary
to trigger the doctrine.
Cases like Tilden make clear that bequests in the late nineteenth cen-
tury were being scrutinized in far different ways depending on whether
they were private or charitable. If the gift was charitable, many courts
were letting it fail and go to the heirs if it was imperfect in form.
Although the possibility was raised of saving gifts through finding a
general charitable intent as in Jackson v. Phillips,52 the finding of such in-
tent was rigidly circumscribed, in the name of protecting the testator's
wishes. Since most men were regarded as selfish profit-maximizers out
for their own family's private gain, the abiding spirit of the times still
regarded as suspect benevolence operating for the public good.
1900-1950: THE ERA OF PROMISE
Something fundamental happened in American social thought around
the beginning of the twentieth century. Faced with the grim misery of the
industrial slums, thoughtful individuals began to realize that the free
market was not working for all, nor in fact for the majority of people in
this new urban society.
The pivotal figure of Harvard Law Dean Rsocoe Pound set the
challenge for American law at the turn of the century: "The problem,
therefore, of the present is to lead our law to hold a more even balance
between individualism and collectivism. Its present extreme in-
dividualism must be tempered to meet the ideas of the modern world. '53
In business, Pittsburgh steel magnate Andrew Carnegie gave credence
to the notion that great wealth was a public trust to be administered not
for the excessive benefit of private heirs, but for the good of the public.5 4
Though the courts were somewhat tardy in applying the notions of
legalphilosophers and early philanthropists, their first use of the "public
trust" theory can be seen just after World War One.55
"Under this doctrine, it is not the purpose of the trust which has failed, requiring the
funds to be put to an allied use (cy pres), but the mechanics of the trust which are inade-
quate, requiring changes in the trust's administration.
1296 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
53Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 THE GREEN BAG 17, 24 (1906).
1"See, e.g., Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653 (1889); Carnegie, The Best Fields for
Philanthropy, 149 N. AM. REV. 682 (1889). See generally, Chester, Inheritance and Wealth
Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 62, 88-92 (1976).
"See, e.g., Wachovia Banking & Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 331, 107 S.E. 238,
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The depression years of the 1930's brought the added realization that it
was in the pragmatic interest of society to defuse revolutionary pressures
by applying great wealth for the public benefit. One court noted, for in-
stance, that in a society with a sense of personal responsibility for wealth
"there is little temptation to the violent explosions" so prevalent in other
lands.5 6 Another opinion, written in the depths of the Depression, speaks
of the necessity of relying on private beneficence to meet some of the
needs of these "troubled times." 57 Against the backdrop of this
awareness of the need for giving broad effect to charitable trusts, 8 came
the notable cy pres case of In re Will of Neher.19
In Neher, the New York Court of Appeals found the doctrine of cy pres
applicable to a devise of land to a town for the building of a memorial
hospital which the town was unable to erect and maintain. Actually, the
inadequacy of hospital facilities had already been remedied by using the
hospital of a neighboring town. Applying classic cy pres analysis, the
court decided that the testator's primary intent was to create a memorial
for her husband. Thus the court allowed the land to be used for a
memorial town administration building, noting that where the para-
mount purpose of the testator is to give property for general charitable
purposes, the manner of carrying the general gift into effect may be ig-
nored when compliance is impractical.61
Neher was not an isolated occurence. "It was during this period when
'individualism' gradually lost ground to 'public welfare,' and the clasp of
the dead hand was loosened, that the cy pres doctrine began to be freely
applied by the courts."' 61 When faced with a great increase in the amount
of charitable trust property, 62 a phenomenon which had been encouraged
substantially by favorable tax treatment for charitable giving, the courts
began to apply the cy pres doctrine liberally.63 During the period from
1900-1950, twenty-one jurisdictions expressly applied cy pres for the
first time, and many statutes were passed by state legislatures expressly
giving the cy pres power to courts.64
242 (1921); see also Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278 (1928), cert denied, 279
U.S. 839 (1929).
"In re Estate of Browning, 165 Misc. 819, 829, 1 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (Sur. Ct. 1938), afl'd,
281 N.Y. 577, 22 N.E.2d 160 (1939).
"In re Estate of Dean, 167 Misc. 238, 240, 3 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
"See generally Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1920).
"279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939).
60IdC at 374, 18 N.E.2d at 626.
"FISCH, supra note 12, at 123. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677
(1934), noted in 35 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1935).
"See Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and Charitable Trust 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 1
(1938).
"FISCH. supra note 12, at 120. For examples of this favorable tax treatment, see Revenue
Act of 1926, Ch. 27, § 303(b)(3), 44 Stat. 73 (1926) (current version at I.R.C. § 2055 (estate
tax deduction)); id. §214(a)(10), 44 Stat. 27-28 (1926) (current version at I.R.C. §170 (income
tax deduction).
"FISCH, supra note 12, at 120 n.16.
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Over the years, three primary requirements had developed for the ap-
plication of cy pres.65 The first of these-that a valid charitable trust have
been expressly created-crumbled quickly during the 1900-1950 period:
courts began to imply a valid charitable trust where only a simple gift
had been made to charity.16 The second-that the original bequest must
have become impossible or impractical of application-retreated before
the courts' increased willingness to discover "impossibility" when con-
fronted with what they considered a much better use of the bequest.
6 1
Still, the troublesome requirement remained that in order to apply cy
pres to a charitable trust whose specific purpose had failed, the court was
required to find that the testator possessed a more general charitable in-
tent.6 8 Though this requirement was abolished by statute in Penn-
sylvania in 1947,69 elsewhere it was not eliminated, courts refusing to ap-
ply cy pres in the absence of general charitable intent, particularly where
a gift over was provided for in the instrument.70
1950-1978: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED
Erosion of the Requirements for Cy Pres Application
Since the history of cy pres in America had been one of slow, but steady
expansion of the doctrine, 71 one might have anticipated the virtual
elimination by modern times of all the technical requirements for its ap-
plication, just as Edith Fisch proposed in the 1959 Cornell Law Quar-
terly. 7 According to Fisch, the prerequisites for applying cy pres served
"no useful end":
Their elimination ... would not only render unnecessary the
present circumlocutions employed to take cases outside the or-
bit of cy pres, but would facilitate the preservation of
charitable gifts since the only question ... would then be the
proper exercise of the court's discretion [in requiring] a dif-
ferent mode of operation or choice of another charitable pur-
pose [for the trust]. 7'
65Icd at 128.
"See, e.g., In re Estate of Walter, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N.Y.S. 400 (Sur. Ct. 1933); In re Will
of Mill, 121 Misc. 147, 200 N.Y.S. 701 (Sur. Ct. 1923); Read v. Willard Hosp., 215 Mass.
132, 102 N.E. 95 (1913).
'FISCH. supra note 12, at 139.
8Id. at 128, 150-51.
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.10 (Purdon 1947)(now appearing at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§6110 (Purdon 1975)).70See, e.g., Roberds v. Markham, 81 F. Supp. 38, 41-42 (D.D.C. 1948).
"1For an optimistic view of this expansion, see Peters, A Decade of Cy Pres, 39 TEMPLE
L.Q. 256 (1966). "Courts will go to great lengths to find a general charitable objective." Id.
at 277.
7'Fisch, supra note 33, at 393.
73I& One requirement that had apparently been eliminated-that a valid charitable trust
be in existence (supra note 66 and accompanying text)-has been resuscitated by the
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Indeed, courts in many recent cases have adopted an expansive at-
titude toward the requirement of "impossibility" or "impracticability"
in carrying out the provisions of the trust.74 However, proof that this
restriction still has some life is found in the 1976 California case of
Mabury's Estate,75 which stated that the requirement was not satisfied if
the impossibility might only prove to be temporary.
Much less progress has been made in modifying the rule requiring a
general charitable intent by the settlor. A recent article has noted,
however, that modern courts have found a general charitable intent
rather easily where there is a failure of the specific charitable purpose
after, rather than before, the trust has become effective.7 1 In spite of this
liberalization, the article's authors thought it preferable to imply a
general charitable intent in all charitable trusts in order to avoid the re-
quirement altogether. 7
The Bogerts, in their monumental treatise Trusts and Trustees,7 8 have
likewise called for the removal of the troublesome "general intent" rule.
In their view, the rule causes many unnecessary claims by heirs or next of
kin of the settlor and much expensive and time-consuming litigation:
[I]t would seem preferable either to provide that the charitable
intent shall be presumed to be general unless the settlor ex-
pressly negates the application of cy pres or to follow the Penn-
sylvania statutory precedent [supra at note 69] and make cy
pres applicable whether the settlor's charitable intent is found
to be general or special.7 9
To these calls for elimination of the "general charitable intent" rule,
which would make the application of cy pres virtually automatic in the
event of a failed charitable trust, the courts have turned a deaf ear.
Though "impossibility" has become easier to find, and neither
undesignated charitable beneficiaries nor the styling of the bequest as a
gift rather than trust now hinder application of cy pres, the dead hand of
the settlor still controls the fund through the courts' observance of his or
her intent.
A possible reason for the continuation of dead hand control lies in one
of the dilemmas of American democracy-the conflict between individual
control over property and the use of that property for the common good.
Supreme Court of Alabama in Baxley v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 334 So. 2d 848
(Ala. 1976).
7 See, e.g., Rogers v. Attorney General, 347 Mass. 126, 196 N.E.2d 855 (1964); Matter of
Scott, 8 N.Y.2d 419, 208 N.Y.S.2d 984, 171 N.E.2d 326 (1960). See also, Report of Commit-
tee on Charitable Trusts & Foundations, Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in Ap-
plication, 8 REAL PROP.. PROB. & TRUST J. 391, 393 (1973).
7554 Cal. App. 3d 969, 127 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1976).
7 Report, supra note 74, at 395, citing City of Danville v. Caldwell, 311 S.W.2d 561 (Ky.
1958).
77Report, supra note 74, at 396.7
'G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d rev. ed. 1977).
'Id. §§361-470, at 527.
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Courts may be reluctant to assume a direct role in reallocating charitable
funds for public purposes precisely for fear of taking one more step
toward the obliteration of individual will in an increasingly socialist
world. As this modern dilemma is examined, it may be asked whether in-
dividual control, however important to our system during an individual's
life, should extend beyond the testator's original post-mortem purpose.
A recent article in the Chicago-Kent Law Review80 takes a critical look
at Illinois' relaxation81 of the key cy pres requirement of general
charitable intent in In re Estate of Tomlinson."2 In this case the Illinois
Supreme Court allowed a bequest to the non-existent "Cancer Research
Fund" to be given to the American Cancer Society despite the claims of
private heirs. Recognizing this case as an example of the increasing trend
in judicial decisions to favor the collective good over the individual's
right to dispose of his property, the authors Gettleman and Hodgman la-
ment that only "lip service" is being paid by the courts to individual con-
trol over private property. 83 Because of the precedent the opinion sets,
the authors would have preferred, given a decision in favor of the
American Cancer Society, that it have been based on the theory of
"misdesignation" of beneficiary, "which places primary emphasis on
respect for the 'dead hand' of the testator. 8 4 Casting the decision in
terms of cy pres results "in a new system of allocation of charitable be-
quests administered by the courts, often with the participation of the
state attorney general." ' One practical reason for preferring the
misdesignation doctrine is that a smaller charity may be able to prove
that, despite the mistake in designation, it was in fact the charity intend-
ed by the testator. Once allowed to apply cy pres to the fund, the state
through its courts and attorney general are likely, in the authors' opi-
nion, to apply it in favor of a well-established and publicly-sanctioned
charity like the American Cancer Society.8
The implications of this stance are fascinating. What the authors ap-
pear to be assuming-and with some truth-is that charities like the
American Cancer Society or the Ford Foundation are in fact quasi-public
in nature.8 7 If the state through its courts and attorney general is given
'
0 Gettleman & Hodgman, Judicial Construction of Charitable Bequests: Theory vs. Prac-
tice, 53 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 659 (1977).
"Prior to In re Estate of Tomlinson, 65 Ill. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976), a finding of
general charitable intent had had to meet stricter standards. See, e.g., Strand v. United
(Methodist) Church of Sheldon, 12 Ill. App. 3d 917, 298 N.E.2d 779 (1973).
8265 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88, 359 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1976). For a case in another jurisdiction
showing relaxation of the general intent requirement, see Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 34
N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1960).
"
3 Gettleman & Hodgman, supra note 80, at 663-64.
"Id. at 668.
851d
'"Id at 669.
'
7For differing views of this problem see M. CUNINGGIM. PRIVATE MONEY AND PUBLIC SER-
VICE 4-5 (1972) and Report of the President of the Carnegie Corporation, 1968, in FOUNDA-
TIONS UNDER FIRE 54-55 (Reeves ed. 1970). See also, Hart. Foundations and Social Ac-
[Vol. 54:407
CYPRES
free rein to change the recipient of a failed charitable trust, it is more like-
ly to allocate the gift to one of these large quasi-public charities rather
than to a lesser-known charity which has little of this public
character-though the latter may in fact have been the intended recip-
ient. What Gettleman and Hodgman may actually fear is that the ex-
panded use of cy pres will begin to cut out truly private "small" charities
altogether, with the state through its courts, attorney general and large,
quasi-public foundations, actually appropriating private donations for
uses sanctioned and controlled by the state. Thus, in effect, a failed
charitable turst would "escheat" to the state, and "state socialism"
would prevail over individual property rights in the area of so-called
"private" philanthropy.
Return of the Dead Hand
Fear of the courts' interference with a testator's intent may be behind
recent decisions refusing cy pres application in some important jurisdic-
tions. The 1976 California case of Mabury's Estate8 8 in preliminarily
refusing to apply cy pres, did so by reviving the nearly moribund require-
ment of "impossibility." Since the Mabury testamentary trust was to ac-
cumulate income until one of two named contingencies occured, 9 it had
been argued that a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposing up
to a 100% rate of tax on accumulated distributions0 made the trust pur-
pose impossible and therefore subject to the cy pres power. The appeals
court ruled to the contrary that whatever "impossibility" existed was
only temporary, and that the testator's purpose would not become impos-
sible until there had been a definitive ruling by the federal courts that
this trust was subject to the tax.91 If the trust were held to be subject to
the tax, thus removing the impossibility bar, the court still expressly re-
served the power to inquire whether there was a general charitable intent
before applying cy pres. The hesitancy to apply cy pres in this case is
remarkable in light of the previous eagerness of California courts to use
the doctrine. 2
New York, a jurisdiction long suspicious of charitable trusts
themselves, has exhibited no reluctance in blocking cy pres application
by the failure to find general charitable intent. One recent example was
tivism: A Critical View, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 43, 47 (1973).
854 Cal. App. 3d 969, 127 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1976). See also, Plechner v. Widener College,
Inc., 569 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Gauser 79 Wisc. 2d 180, 255 N.W.2d 483 (1977).
'Trust income was to accumulate until after the death of testator's sister and when
either (1) the Christian Science Church published a certain book as official church literature
or (2) 21 years had expired after the death of the survivor of a certain three living persons,
the income was to be distributed.
'9I.R.C. §4942.
"54 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
"See, e.g., In re Estate of Vanderhoofven, 8 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971);
Estate of Faulkner, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1954).
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the Matter of Syracuse University,9 3 in which the University was denied
permission to apply cy pres to a gift in trust to the Medical College of
Syracuse University after that College had ceased to exist and became
part of the State University of New York. The court held that the
testator had no general charitable intent to benefit Syracuse University,
beyond the specific intent of funding a medical college there.
Continuing this pattern is the more recent case of DePew v. Union Free
School District.4 The Depew court, in a remarkably hidebound decision,
gives the dead hand firm control by ruling that the trial court should at-
tempt to discover whether the testator had a general intent to benefit
education in a particular school district or whether he wished the benefit
to be limited to the use of the bequeathed land as a school. Thus, in order
to discern the actual intent of the testator, the trial court was instructed
to consult school minutes and diaries dating from the time the bequest
was made in 1852. Had it taken the time, the Depew Court would likely
have echoed sentiments expressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
another charitable trust construction decision, also rendered in 1973:
The clearly expressed intention of the settlor should be
zealously guarded by the courts, particularly when the trust
instrument reveals a careful and painstaking expression of the
use and purposes to which [his assets] shall be devoted. A set-
tlor must have assurance that his solemn arrangements and in-
structions will not be subject to the whim or suggested
expediency of others after his death.95
Even more surprising is the most recent attempt to apply cy pres in the
jurisdiction which gave the doctrine its first substantial life.16 In First
Church of Somerville (Unitarian) v. Attorney General 97 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to find any general intent to
933 N.Y.2d 665, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958). To similar effect was In re Jones' Estate, 201
Misc. 881, 108 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sur. Ct. 1951), in which the court refused to save the gift to
the defunct, unincorporated 89th St. Church, despite the cy pres petition of its parent, the
incorporated Low Dutch Church of Harlem, Inc., because no general charitable intent was
shown; testator's intent was solely to benefit the 89th St. Church.
'441 App. Div. 2d 308, 342 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
"First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Wyo. 1973). This action
was brought by the trustee of a fund which provided scholarships for children from
Cheyenne and Casper, Wyoming, for attendance at either the University of Wyoming or
Casper Community College. The trustee sought to apply the fund to children from these
communities who wished to attend Laramie County Community College. Since the original
trust purposes had not become impossible or impractical to fulfill, the trustee sought the
alteration via the doctrine of equitable deviation. See supra note 51. Even this modest
change was denied by the court for the reason stated in the quotation to which this note
refers.
"
6See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867). More recently, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had little trouble in finding the general charitable
intent necessary to cy pres in Wesley United Church v. Harvard College, 366 Mass. 247,
316 N.E.2d 620 (1974).
1178 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 376 N.E.2d 1226 (1978).
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benefit the Unitarian religion in the will of the testator despite the pleas
of the appellant Unitarian Universalist Association:
On the contrary, we conclude that the intent of the testator in
this case was to support the particular Unitarian church which
he had helped establish and, in the alternative [via a "gift
over"], to support Unitarian education at Harvard and the
poor of McLean Asylum .... 98
Since the gift over was meant to take effect "if the [church] changes its
religious tenets and ceasefs] to inculcate a 'Liberal Religion,' "it became
effective when "[b]y dissolving, the [church] ... ceased to inculcate any
religion."9 9 Had there been no gift over, the court having found no
general charitable intent to support cy pres might have allowed the in-
itial gift to fail, as was done recently by the supreme court of a neigh
boring state despite a highly appealing fact situation for the application
of the doctrine. 100
Had the gift over in First Church of Somerville been to a private in-
dividual it would have been subject to the Rule against Perpetuities.10'
Since the church might have stopped "inculcating a Liberal Religion," at
any time after the testator's death, one could not be certain that the gift
over would vest, if at all, within human lives in being at the testator's
death, plus twenty-one years; thus, this gift over would fail under the
Rule, thus instead of deciding as it did between the unappealing alter-
"Ici at 1449, 376 N.E.2d at 1230.
"Id at 1450, 376 N.E.2d at 1230.
'"In Industrial Nat'l Bank of R.I. v. Glocester Manton Free Pub. Library, 107 R.I. 161,
265 A.2d 724 (1970), a gift to a defunct nursing home was held to have been in appreciation
to the home for the care given testator's father, and without general intent to help the ill
and elderly.
Some recent decisions have held that the existence of any gift over blocks cy pres ap-
plication. See e.g., Simmons v. Parsons College, 256 N.W.2d 225 (1977). This is simply
another method of "holding the line" against the free application of cy pres made possible
by loose tests of "general charitable intent." What cases like Simmons are saying is that
the existence of any gift over shows there is no general charitable intent-only primary
and alternative specific intents. Whether a gift over which is void because of the Rule
against Perpetuities (but is nonetheless expressive of testator's intent) would by the same
token be held to block cy pres application is uncertain.
The opposite rule, allowing cy pres application to the primary charitable gift regardless
of a gift over, appears to be in force in England. See Hanbey's Will Trusts [1955] 3 All E.R.
874, 879 (stating the rule and citing previous case to that effect);see also G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, supra note 78, at 496-98 & n.28. Likewise, in England the mere existence of a
residuary gift, even to charity, does not prevent application of cy pres to the original
charitable bequest. Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate General of Bengal, [1875-76], 1 A.C. 91; In
re Cunningham, [1914] 1 Ch. 427.
Though Simmons states the _general American rule, see IV A. ScoTT TRUSTS 3907 & nn.4
5 (3d ed. 1967), the English rule seems preferable in allowing greater flexibility to the court.
A California court in effect applied the English rule in Society of Cal. Pioneers v. McElroy,
63 Cal. App. 332, 146 P.2d 962 (1944). More recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the application of equitable deviation, supra note 51, to the original
charitable bequest was not precluded by the existence of a gift over to an alternative chari-
ty. This latter result is predicated on the ground that giving effect to the gift over would
work a forfeiture-on the primary charitable trust. See IV A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 401.3 at
107-08 (Supp. 1979).
"'This is true in Massachusetts despite statutory modifications of the Rule contained in
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native of intestacy and the attractive one of funding secondary charitable
beneficiaries, the Somerville court, if faced with a void gift over, would
have had to choose between cy pres application and the allowance of in-
testate succession. Since the Somerville court insists that "each case
turns on the intent of the particular testator,' ' 10 2 it might have been
forced to admit that allowing intestate succession flies in the face of such
intent, whereas the use of cy pres to benefit, for example, the Unitarian
Universalist Association at least gives life to the primacy placed by the
testator on leaving the fund for charitable purposes.
Whether or not it denied cy pres primarily because the gift over was
also charitable, the Somerville decision unquestionably favors large
"quasi-public" charities (Harvard and the famous McLean Hospital) at
the expense of the appellant Unitarian Universalist Association. The
Unitarians, as a particular sect of the Protestant Religion, are a private
charity, specifically dissociated from the state by the first amendment of
the Constitution.0 3 If the chief concern of courts in this area were to
become the distribution of failed bequests to quasi-public, state sanc-
tioned charities, courts might reach the unfair position of applying cy
pres where it favors these charities (as in Tomlinson), but discarding it
where unnecessary to such a result (as in First Church of Somerville).
The Strengthening of Judicial Control over Cy Pres
Whether or not this tendency to favor quasi-public charities already ex-
ists, it is clear from recent cases like DePew in New York and First
Church of Somerville in Massachusetts that, despite the appeals of com-
mentators, the requirement of general intent not only remains intact but
may have been strengthened. Part of the resistance to eliminating the
general intent barrier may stem from the traditional fear of judges that
removing the prime restriction on the use of any controversial doctrine
will simply "open the floodgates." If the requirement of general
charitable intent were removed, the only substantial question remaining
for the court would be what other charity should now get the funds of the
failed trust. Unless the testator specifically provided in the document
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §1-6 (West 1977). See Davenport v. Attorney General, 361
Mass. 372, 280 N.E.2d 193 (1972). For purposes of the discussion in this article, reference is
made to the common law Rule, despite statutory reforms in some of the states.
At common law, if (as in Somerville) there is a gift to Charity A followed by a gift over to
Charity B if a specified event occurs, the executory interest in Charity B is exempt from
the Rule. 4 A. ScOrr. TRUSTS §401.5 (3d ed. 1967). The exemption does not apply if either
the possessory estate or the future interest is in a private individual. Id at §§401.6 -401.7.
In the case posited here, with the future interest in an individual beneficiary, the rule
voiding the future interest is stated in cases collected in §401.6 n.3, including the leading
case of First Universalist Soc'y of N. Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892).
10278 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443,1449, 376 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (1978).
'"U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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that cy pres could not be applied, gifts over, even to charity, would not be
given effect. Thus, these alternative dispositions would only be of use if
they were similar in purpose to the original bequest and could provide the
court with useful suggestions as to how to apply the funds of the failed
trust.
Not only do courts appear to want to retain their power to decide
whether cy pres shall be applied to a given trust, but they have not been
ready to share this power with their legislatures. The Massachusetts
legislature recently asked the Supreme Judicial Court whether it had the
authority to now order that the care, custody, management and control
of the Franklin Institute [established by applying the cy pres power to a
fund left by Benjamin Franklin to help young artisans get a financial
start in business] 0 4 be transferred from the Franklin Foundation to
Boston University and the City of Boston when the trust establishing
the foundation expires in 1991.105 The court determined not only that the
legislature had no authority to use the cy pres power, but that no one had
the right to ask the courts to apply that power to purposes chosen by
designated beneficiaries [e.g., the City of Boston] now, since the terms of
Franklin's will contemplate distribution by the city government in 1991
for purposes to be chosen in 1991.106 Thus, not only was cy pres to remain
outside the power of the publicly-elected legislature, but it could not be
exercised in advance in violation of Benjamin Franklin's expressed in-
tent. Perhaps the Massachusetts courts have understood that once they
cease to be the guardians of the testator's intent, their claim to use cy
pres at all will be in jeopardy; once the initial question becomes not
whether to apply the doctrine, but how to apply the fund in question for
the public good, one has moved into a traditionally legislative area of
decision-making.
11
7
0'Franklin established virtually identical funds for the cities of Philadelphia and Boston.
For the history of the Philadelphia fund and the refusal of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to allow trust income to accumulate or to apply cy pres to the trust, see Benjamin
Franklin's Estate, 27 W.N. 545, 48 Leg. Int. 136 (1891), affd, 150 Pa. 437, 24 A. 626 (1892).
The tale of the Boston fund is still unwinding, for a summary of Massachusetts' allowance
both of accumulation and cy pres, see Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 340 Mass.
197, 163 N.E.2d 662 (1960), recounted in DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON. supra note 21, at
1358-59.
'"
5Order No. 6664 of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, October 12, 1977.
"'Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court: Transfer to the City of Boston
of Assets of the Franklin Institute in 1991 by Legislation, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1 (1978).
'O'Nonetheless, legislatures in 25 states now give the power to their Attorneys General, if
written consent cannot be obtained from the donor (because of death or other cause) for
removal of restrictions on a charitable fund whose purpose has failed, to bring an action for
removal of the restriction. "If the court finds the restriction is obsolete, inappropriate or
impracticable, it may by order release the restriction in whole or in part .... This section
does not limit the application of the doctrine of cy pres." Uniform Management of Institu-
tional Funds Act, 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. §7(b)(d) (Master ed. 1978).
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CONCLUSION
The progress made by courts since the 1850's in applying the cy pres
doctrine to failed charitable bequests has come to a standstill in the
1970's due to the persistence of the requirement of general charitable in-
tent. a remnant of the stress on individual property rights so prevalent in
Anglo-American common law. As this author has suggested elsewhere,
the delicate balance between property rights and the common good can
justifiably be tilted in favor of the public when an individual attempts to
control property beyond the grave, particularly when this control is to ex-
tend beyond the testator's initial post-mortem disposition.0 8 If, as the
author has argued elsewhere, dead hand control over property passing to
individual heirs might be limited to providing a comfortable but not lux-
urious living to the initial takers, and little, if anything to subsequent
heirs,10 9 why not limit the testator's control over charitable bequests, by
giving effect only to the initial charitable bequest? Once the original
charitable trust fails, the courts (or legislature, if one prefers) should be
able to apply the fund cy pres, whether or not there is a gift over and
whether or not this gift over is to a charitable or individual '" beneficiary.
Society may be protected by denying cy pres application to the original
bequest where the gift over is for a charitable purpose and by applying
the doctrine where the gift over, though still valid under the Rule against
Perpetuities, is not charitable. For the sake of doctrinal consis
tency, however, it would seem preferable to impose an across-the-board
limitation on the remoteness of dead hand control, whether the failed be-
quest is followed by no gift over, by a noncharitable gift over which is
void under the Rule, by a valid noncharitable gift over, or even by a
secondary charitable gift. Once the testator expresses the primacy of his
general intent via the original charitable gift, one may argue that he has
put the gift within the public realm where a court should be empowered,
upon failure, to apply it for a related purpose, regardless of any secon-
dary dispositions which may have been made. In this way, a court can
refuse to extend dead hand control beyond an original charitable gift
which has failed over the passage of time."'
Under the above formulation, courts can preserve the testator's
primary charitable intent by choosing as an alternative a viable charity
'"Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 62
(1976).
109Id
"'If the event divesting the initial charitable gift in favor of individual beneficiaries
must happen within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or is vested at the time of
creation of the trust, or must vest, if at all within the period, the gift over to the individual
beneficiaries is valid. A. SCOTT. supra note 101 at §401.6. See e.g., Holsey v. Atlantic Nat'l
Bank, 115 Fla. 604, 155 So. 821 (1934).
'"If, however, the charitable gift failed before its inception, it would not be sensible to
deny testator his secondary intent as expressed in the gift over.
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as near as possible to the one chosen as the original recipient. In making
this determination, the court should face the issues raised by Gettleman
and Hodgman1 2 and be wary of automatically giving the fund to a char-
ity whose very importance has embellished it with quasi-public at-
tributes. In applying trust funds cy pres, courts should be aware that
they are functioning as distributive, not commutative,
decision-makers, 1 3 and be careful to allocate the assets of the failed trust
as equitably and justly as possible between competing charities.
The judicial determination to apply cy pres freely upon failure of the
original bequest is itself a distributive judgment. Not only should courts
realize that by so doing they are directing the allocation for common pur-
poses of assets which under the common law might have gone to secon-
dary beneficiaries, but they should also, as the Legal Realists recom-
mend, explicitly admit that they are doing S0.114 At the turn of this cen-
tury, Roscoe Pound realized the need to temper the extreme in-
dividualism which characterized society, as well as his law school and its
jurisprudence."' Modern courts, too, facing as they do both over-
whelming social need and an overtaxed, even rebellious citizenry,1 1
6 will
best serve the interests of society in the charitable trust field by applying
cy pres widely and openly as a matter of public policy and by paying less
regard to notions of individual intent, more suitable to a pre-industrial
state.
1"Supra note 78.
"
3
"Distributive" and "commutative" justice were terms first used by Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas. F.A. HAYEK. THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 441 n.11 (1960). Friedrich
Hayek has discussed the modern meaning of the terms in the following way:
The restrictions which the rule of law imposes upon government ... preclude
all those measures which would be necessary to insure that individuals will be
rewarded according to another's conception of merit or desert rather than ac-
cording to the value that their services have for their fellows-or what
amounts to the same thing, it precludes the use of distributive, as opposed to
commutative justice. Id- at 232.... In Aristotelian terms... liberalism aims
at commutative justice and socialism at distributive justice.
Id& at 440 n.10.
Thus the distributive decision-maker centrally directs the particular distribution of
wealth desired, whereas the commutative decision-maker serves only as a "referee," allow-
ing the principles of law and economy to determine "who gets what."
"
4Supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
"'Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
"
6See, e.g., the famous California Initiative Measure, "Proposition 13," approved by the
people June 6, 1978, CAL. CONST. art. 13A.
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